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POOLING AGREEMENTS UNDER THE NEW
CALIFORNIA GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
William K. S. Wang*
INTRODUCTION * *
A pooling agreement is a contract among shareholders that
their shares will be voted as a unit.1 Pooling agreements should
not be confused with voting trusts. In a pooling agreement, each
party retains legal and beneficial ownership of his or her shares. In
a voting trust, the parties transfer the shares to one or more trustees
in exchange for trust certificates. 2 The voting trust has the advan-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego, School of Law;
B.A. 1967, Amherst College; J.D. 1971, Yale Law School. This Article was
written in early 1976 while the author was a Visiting Professor of Law at the
University of California, Davis.
•* Certain citation conventions are employed throughout this Symposium.
These conventions are presented at page vii.
1 See H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 421 (1946); 2 H.
OLECK, MODERN CRPORATION LAW 780 (1959); 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]. Cf. Com-
ment, Shareholder Pooling Agreements-Validity, Legality and Enforcement, 24
ARK. L. REV. 501 (1971). Under the usual definition of a pooling agreement,
the contracting parties retain the individual right to vote their shares in a prede-
termined manner. 1 O'NEAL, supra at § 5.03; Note, The Validity of Stockhold-
ers' Voting Agreements in Illinois, 3 U. Cm. L. REV. 640, 641 (1936). However,
for the purpose of the present discussion, the term "pooling agreement" will be
used in a broader sense to include contracts in which the parties transfer their
voting power by irrevocable proxies to a person who votes the stock in one block
as contractually provided (e.g., as directed by majority vote). See generally
1 O'NEAL, supra at §§ 5.03, 5.36.
According to Fletcher, a pooling agreement does not bind the shareholders
to vote or direct their shares to be voted in a certain way and should not be con-
fused with shareholders' agreements containing provisions specifically describing
how the parties should vote on certain matters. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 2064, at 289 (rev. ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as FLETCHER]. This may be an overly narrow definition. For the purpose
of this discussion, the term "pooling agreement" will include contracts in which
the parties bind themselves to vote as shareholders in a specified manner (e.g.,
for specified directors).
However, it is important to distinguish between pooling agreements and con-
tracts governing how the directors themselves are to vote. W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 28 (1975); W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND
TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 111 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
PAINTER].
If the proxy holder's vote is not determined by contract, the agreement will
not be considered a pooling agreement for the purpose of this discussion. It might
instead be labeled an unconditional irrevocable proxy. Cf. Stein v. Capital Out-
door Advertising, Inc., 273 N.C. 77, 82, 159 S.E.2d 351, 355-56 (1968).
2 The voting trust has been defined as:
1171
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tage of being self-executing; the trustee has an irrevocable power to
vote the shares.' But the holder of voting trust certificates may
have fewer rights than a record shareholder,4 and the certificates
[a trust] created by an agreement between a group of the stockholders of
a corporation and the trustee, or by a group of identical agreements
between individual stockholders and a common trustee, whereby it is
provided that for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a
certain event, or until the agreement is terminated, control over the
stock owned by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for
all, shall be lodged in the trustee, either with or without a reservation
to the owners or persons designated by them of the power to direct how
such control shall be used.
5 FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 2075, at 365-66. See generally I O'NEAL, supra
note 1, at § 5.31; PAINTER, supra note 1, at § 3.2; Baldwin, Voting-Trusts, 1 YALE
L.J. 1 (1891); Burke, Voting Trusts Currently Observed, 24 MINN. L. REV. 347
(1940); Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20 WASH.
L. REV. 129 (1945); Note, The Voting Trust: California Erects a Barrier to a
Rational Law of Corporate Control, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1210 (1966); Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 376 (1964).
3 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 193,
at 374.3-375 (1976); 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 114-45 (1976);
Sturdy, The Significance of "Form" and "Purpose" in Determining the Effec-
tiveness of Agreements Among Stockholders to Control Corporate Manage-
ment, 13 Bus. LAw. 283, 284-85 (1958).
4 One disadvantage may be a loss of shareholder rights. See H. BALLAN-
TINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 431-32 (1946); Ballantine, Voting Trusts,
Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 TEXAS L. REV. 139, 159-61 (1942); Comment,
Corporations: Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 284-
86 (1948); Comment, Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 480,
482-84 (1968). Cf. Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting
Trusts, 20 WASH. L. REV. 129, 139-49 (1945). But cf. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
BILL § 800(b) and CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(a) (West Supp. 1976) (allowing
voting trust certificate holders to bring derivative actions); NEW CODE § 1600(c);
TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 1601 and CAL. CORP. CODE § 3003 (West 1955)
(granting inspection rights to voting trust certificate holders).
Another disadvantage of a voting trust is that a corporation cannot elect Sub-
chapter S status if any of its shares are in a voting trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-
1(e) (1969). The Tax Court in dictum has expressed reservations as to the Com-
missioner's interpretation of the statute. Catalina Homes, Inc., CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1361, 1368 (1964). Two district courts have specifically rejected the
I.R.S. interpretation. Lafayette Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp.
71.9 (W.D. La. 1975); A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967). See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.02, at n.13 (1971); D. CRUMBLEY
& P. DAVIS, ORGANIZING, OPERATING, AND TERMINATING SUBCHAPTER S CORPORA-
TIONS 64-65 (1974); Z. "CAvrrCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS § 303[4] (1976); I. GRANT, SUBCHAPTER S TAXATION § 8.3 (1974); D.
KAHN, BASIC CORPORATION TAXATION 381-82 (1973); I. SCHREIBER, S. GOLDEN &
S. TRAUM, SUBCHAPTER S: PLANNING AND OPERATION § 101.4E (Supp. 1976).
See also W & W Fertilizer Corp. v. United States, 527 F.2d 621, 627 n.11 (Ct.
Cl. 1975). But see Friend's Wine Cellars, Inc., CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 740, 743
(1972).
The Internal Revenue Service at one time took the position that a corporation
was disqualified from electing Subchapter S if its stockholders entered into any
voting trust or pooling agreement giving one or more shareholders voting power
disproportionate to other shareholders. The Commissioner subsequently withdrew
this interpretation. See B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
1172
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are securities under California and federal securities laws. '  Be-
cause of these and other complicating aspects of the voting trust,
Professor Henry Ballantine has commented-that a pooling agree-
ment containing irrevocable proxies is "a much more simple and
satisfactory method for authorizing an irrevocable delegation of
voting power . . . than the voting trust . . ." and advocated
statutory authorization of such voting agreements.'
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.02, at 6-6, 6-7 (1971); id. § 6.02 (Supp.
1975); Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §
3.03[5], at 3-31, 3-32 (1976); W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN BusI-
NESS PLANNING 152 (1975); 1. SCHREIBER, S. GOLDEN & S. TRAuM, SUBCHAPTER
S: PLANNING AND OPERATION § 101.6E (Supp. 1976).
5 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1976); Securities Act of 1933,
§ 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)
(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1970); 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS § 5.16 (rev. ed. 1975); 3 H. BLOOMEN-
THAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 2.23 (1975); Diczok, Recent
Cases, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 183, 190 (1975). See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
460 & n.18 (1961). See generally Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life
Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
Conceivably, the California Department of Corporations might argue that a
pooling agreement constitutes a "sale" of securities under CAL. CORP. CODE §
25017(a) (West Supp. 1976) because it changes the voting rights or privileges
of outstanding securities. Letter from Alan J. Barton, Esq., to Walter G. Olson,
Esq., June 11, 1975, copy on file with the UCLA Law Review. See generally
1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS §
7.03 (1975). But cf. California Comm'r of Corps., Op. no. 73/73C, involving the
following fact situation. A sole shareholder proposed to sell some of his shares
and, in order to increase their marketability, proposed to sign an agreement that
he would never vote his shares for a resolution authorizing the issuance of more
shares unless the resolution provided for preemptive rights. In deciding that the
agreement would not constitute a change in the rights of outstanding securities
under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(a) (West Supp. 1976), the Commissioner
stated:
A contractural [sic] arrangement, such as that contemplated in the
instant case, arises only by virtue of the personal agreement of the con-
tracting parties and creates a personal obligation of these parties
without changing the statutory framework of the corporation, namely,
its articles of incorporation, which controls the rights, preferences, privi-
leges and restrictions of or on its shares.
California Comm'r of Corps., Op. no. 73/73C, at 2.
6 H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 433 (1946). See 1
O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.34, at 120 (". . . in most jurisdictions a shareholders'
agreement . . . is usually preferable to a voting trust device for allocating con-
trol in a close corporation"); Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Reg-
ulation, 21 TEXAS L. REV. 139, 160-61 (1942); Logan, Methods to Control the
Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7 KAN. L. REV. 405, 422 (1959). Cf. Sturdy,
supra note 3, at 287.
A disadvantage of the voting trust has been the old law's provision
tht all voting trusts may be terminated at any time by a majority of the
beneficial holders of shares in the trust. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2231 (West Supp.
1976). This troublesome provision has been eliminated in the new law, although
the statutory maximum duration of a voting trust has been decreased from twenty-
21 to 10 years (with permission to extend). TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL §
706(b). See note 31 infra.
For an excellent bibliography of materials on both voting trusts and pooling
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The validity of pooling agreements and irrevocable proxies is
governed by the law of the state of incorporation.' Although
California's new corporation law is the first statutory recognition of
shareholders' pooling agreements, such agreements have been valid
under California case law since at least 1897.8 Section 706(a) of
the new law' expressly permits pooling agreements among the
shareholders of a close corporation, but provides that the agree-
ment must end when the corporation loses its status as a close
corporation. Shareholder agreements made "pursuant" to sec-
tion 706(a) are clearly valid and specifically enforceable. Sec-
tion 706(d), however, permits voting agreements outside of sec-
tion 706(a): "This section shall not invalidate any voting or
other agreement among shareholders . . . which agreement . . is
not otherwise illegal."'" Since nothing in the new law prohibits
agreements, see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 34, at 744-49 (2d ed. 1971);
id. at 177-78 (Supp. 1973).
7 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 114-35 (1976); 1 O'NEAL, supra
note 1, at § 5.03. This rule has not been changed by the new California Corpora-
tions Code. See section 2115(b) of the new law, omitting any mention of
sections 705 and 706.
8 Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897);
Schwarzer, Practical Problems of Organizing Closely Held Corporations, in AD-
VISINO CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 403, 408 (State Bar of Cal., Comm. on
Continuing Education of the Bar, 1958); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in
California-Necessity of Separate Treatment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 244-45
(1961). Cf. Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation in
California: Progress and Problems, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 465-66 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Close Corporation]. For a general discussion of the validity of
pooling agreements see Annot.,,45 A.L.R.2d 799 (1956).
9 Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, an agreement
between two or more shareholders of a close corporation, if in writing
and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any
voting rights the shares held by them shall be voted as provided by the
agreement, or as the parties may agree or as determined in accordance
with a procedure agreed upon by them, and the parties may transfer the
shares covered by such an agreement to a third party or parties with
authority to vote them in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Such an agreement shall not be denied specific performance by a court
on the ground that the remedy at law is adequate or on other grounds
relating to the jurisdiction of a court of equity. An agreement made
pursuant to this subdivision between shareholders of a close corporation
shall terminate when the corporation ceases to be a close corporation.
TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 706(a). Refer, however, to the Subsequent
Developments Note which concludes this article. See generally Close Corpora-
tion, supra note 8, at 463-64:
Section 158(a) of the new law defines "close corporation" as follows:
a corporation whose articles contain . . . a provision that all of the
corporation's issued shares of all classes shall be held of record by not
more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 10, and a
statement "This corporation is a close corporation."
TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 158(a). See generally Review of Selected 1975
California Legislation, 7 PAC. L.J. 237, 259 (1976). Hereinafter, the phrase
"close corporation" shall refer to a corporation satisfying the definition in
section 158(a).
10 TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 706(d).
1174 [Vol. 23: 1171
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pooling agreements and the prior case law recognized their validity,
it appears that compliance with section 706(a) is not the exclusive
method of creating a legal voting pool."
I. ENFORCING POOLING AGREEMENTS BY
IRREVOCABLE PROXIES
A pooling agreement may be valid but useless if the law
provides no easy and effective means of enforcing that agreement.
Much of the litigation over pooling agreements has centered on the
question of enforcement. It is not completely settled whether
pooling agreements will be specifically enforced. Although a
number of early cases outside California refused to grant specific
enforcement of such contracts, 12 most of the recent decisions allow
shareholder voting agreements to be enforced by an injunction or a
decree of specific performance. 3 Indeed, the California Supreme
Court decision of Smith v. San Francisco & North Pacific Rail-
way' 4 is often cited as a forerunner of the modern trend" because
it in effect granted specific performance.' However, it appears
that no reported California opinion has decided the appropriate-
ness of issuing a decree compelling a shareholder to comply with
a pooling agreement.
If a pooling agreement contains express irrevocable proxies,
the issue of specific performance need never be raised. It is
unnecessary for complying members of a pool to seek specific
performance through a decree ordering the breaching party to vote
his or her shares according to the contract since the complying
parties could simply cast the vote of the breaching party's shares
pursuant to the proxies in the agreement." The major issue would
11 According to Harold Marsh, Jr., Esq., the principal draftsman of the
New Code, "[Slubdivision (d) of Section 706 preserves any voting agreement
which would have been upheld under the prior law." Letter from Harold Marsh,
Jr., Esq., to William K.S. Wang, October 7, 1975, copy on file with the UCLA
Law Review. See Close Corporation, supra note 8, at 468-69.
12 See 5 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 325-26 & n.90; 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1,
§ 5.30, at 103, 105 n.4. See Comment, Corporations: Voting Trusts and Irre-
vocable Proxies, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 282 & n.5 (1948).
13 See 5 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 2067; 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, at §
5.30; Comment, Corporations-Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements,
45 N.C.L. REV. 228, 230 (1966).
1, 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
15 See, e.g., 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.30, at n.10; Comment, Corpora-
tions--Specific Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements, 45 N.CL. REv. 228, 230
n.10 (1966).
16 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.30, at n.10; Comment, Specific Enforcement
of Shareholder Voting Agreements, 15 U. CHI. L, REV. 738, 741 (1948).
17 See Comment, Shareholder Pooling Agreements-Validity, Legality, and
Enforcement, 24 ARK. L. REV. 501, 519-21 (1971); Comment, The Enforcement
1976] 1175
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then be whether the express proxies in the agreement can be
revoked even though stated to be irrevocable.'
Because of the delay and inconvenience involved in obtaining
a judicial decree of specific performance, one commentator has
gone so far as to suggest that irrevocable proxies are the only
method of effectively enforcing pooling agreements.19 Although
this may overstate the inconvenience of specific performance, there
is no question that irrevocable proxies are at least as effective a




The use of irrevocable proxies to make pooling agreements
self-enforcing has spawned a wide variety of proxies.2 1  Some
proxies are implied by a court; others are created by express
provisions of the pooling agreement. Proxies may be contingent
or "vested." A contingent proxy comes into existence only when a
party refuses to comply with the pooling agreement; normally each
party votes his own shares. 2 If vested irrevocable proxies are
used, the proxy-holder always votes all shares.
Each contracting shareholder may grant proxies to a single
party-a third party or one of the parties to the agreement. Alter-
natively, each stockholder may grant cross-proxies to every other
of Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements: A Proposed Amendment to the Louisi-
ana Business Corporation Law, 6 LOYOLA L. REV. 59, 62 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as The Enforcement of Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements].
18 See The Enforcement of Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements, supra
note 17, at 62. See also 6A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 617(2), (3)
(1974).
19 The legal "mechanics" of the situation are such that if it is impossible
to talk about an "irrevocable" proxy, it is likewise impossible to have a
voting pool agreement susceptible of effective enforcement . . . . Only
a decree of specific performance could then enforce the agreement.
Specific performance requires a new election.
The Enforcement of Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements, supra note 17, at 65.
20 In California, the relationship between proxies and pooling agreements is
especially close. Some commentators have even suggested that a pooling agree-
ment among shareholders of a California corporation is itself a type of proxy
agreement. See Schwarzer, Practical Problems of Organizing Closely Held Cor-
porations, in ADvIsING CALIFORNIA BUSINEss ENTERPRISES 403, 408 (State Bar of
Cal., Comm. on Continuing Education of the Bar, 1958), citing Dougherty v.
Cross, 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 702-03, 151 P.2d 654, 661-62 (2d Dist. 1944), and
Simpson v. Nielson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1st Dist. 1926); Sturdy, supra
note 3, at 288, citing Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47
P. 582 (1897).
21 Cf. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINEss ENTERPRISES 570 (2d ed. 1970); 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.27, at 95;
PAINTER, supra note 1, at § 3.4; O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agree-
ments Against Attack, 14 Bus. LAW. 184, 197 (1958); The Enforcement of
Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements, supra note 17, at 64.
22 Cf. 6A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §§ 617(2), (3) (1974); 1
O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.36, at n.1 (Supp. 1975).
1176 [Vol. 23: 1171
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party. Normally, a cross-proxy is contingent on a breach of
contract; in the event of a breach, the complying party or parties
can vote the shares of the non-complying party.
An attorney drafting a pooling agreement might use the terms
"express contingent irrevocable cross-proxies," "express vested ir-
revocable single-party proxies," or some other combination.23
It may be tempting to select someone outside the contracting
group as holder of vested irrevocable proxies in an arrangement
similar to a voting trust, but this similarity may be hazardous
in some jurisdictions. In Abercrombie v. Davies, 4 the Delaware
Supreme Court examined a shareholder pooling agreement with
express vested irrevocable single-party proxies and found it to be a
voting trust. The court then invalidated the entire arrangement
because the parties had not complied with the statutory require-
ments for voting trusts.
25
After discussing Abercrombie, one commentator stated:
"It is doubtful that this result would be reached in California.
26
The article cited Boericke v. Weise27 and the permissive rather than
23 See Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7
KAN. L. REV. 405, 420 (1959), and authorities cited in note 21 supra. If express
contingent irrevocable cross-proxies are employed, all the parties normally vote
their own shares in accordance with the agreement; but if one party breaches, the
non-complying party's shares are voted by the complying parties. In the case of
express vested irrevocable single-party proxies, the participants in the pooling
agreement grant irrevocable proxies to one party who votes all the shares in one
block in accordance with the contract. For an example of this type of agreement
see Simpson v. Nielson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1st Dist. 1926).
The term "single-party" proxy is intended simply to exclude all cross-proxies.
Technically, a "single-party" proxy might be granted to a group of individuals.
For an example of an "express vested irrevocable single-party proxy" granted by a
shareholder to three individuals, refer to the proxy printed in Callister v. Graham-
Paige Corp., 146 F. Supp. 399, 402 n.1 (D. Del. 1956).
24 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
25 This danger has been largely eliminated in Delaware by the 1967 revision
of the Delaware corporation statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 218(c), (e)%(1974) [prior to July 15, 1969, section 218(e) was section 218(d)]; E. FOLK,
REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 26-27 (1968); E. FOLK, THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 235 (1972); 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, at §
5.33; Comment, Shareholder Pooling Agreements-Validity, Legality and Enforce-
ment, 24 ARK. L. REV. 501, 512 (1971).
26 Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate
Treatment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 245-56 (1961). Accord, Close Corporation,
supra note 8, at 466.
2T 68 Cal. App. 2d 407, 156 P.2d 781 (1st Dist. 1945) (voting trust was
valid although no stock had been delivered to the trustee). See Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 376, 402 (1964). Both the Oppenheim article (supra note 26, at 246)
and the Hastings note (supra note 8, at 466) additionally cite Dougherty v. Cross,
65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (2d Dist. 1944), but the Abercrombie issue
does not appear to have been raised or discussed in that case. See Opening Brief
for Appellant; Brief for Respondent; Closing Brief for Appellant, Dougherty v.
Cross, 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (2d Dist. 1944). Indeed, as noted
in the appellant's opening brief: "At the date of the December [1926] agreement
HeinOnline -- 23 UCLA L. Rev. 1177 1975-1976
1178 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 1171
obligatory language of section 2230 of the old law,2" which does
not impose mandatory formalities on voting trusts.29 For example,
the section provides that "A duplicate of the voting trust agreement
may be filed in the office of the corporation."" °
The new law's language is more restrictive. Under section
706(b), duplicates of the trust agreement and any extension "shall
be filed with the secretary of the corporation."31 However, section
706(c) of the new law expressly provides that no pooling agree-
ment made pursuant to section 706 (a)32 will be invalidated on the
grounds that it is a voting trust not complying with section 706(b).
Furthermore, section 706(d) provides:
This section [including 706(b)] shall not invalidate any vot-
ing or other agreement among shareholders or any irrevocable
proxy complying with subdivision (e) of Section 705, which
...is not otherwise illegal.
Virtually identical language in the Delaware Corporation Law3"
has generally been regarded as a legislative reversal of Abercrom-
bie."' Therefore, section 706(d) presumably protects all pooling
agreements from being invalidated because of their likeness to a
voting trust.3 5
there was no provision in the Civil Code for a voting trust such as was created
by that agreement, and it was not until 1931 that a new section, 321a, was added
to the code providing for voting trusts." Opening Brief for Appellant at 62,
Dougherty v. Cross, 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (2d Dist. 1944).
28 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2230 (West 1955).
29 However, CAL. CORP. CODE § 2231 (West Supp. 1976) does impose a 21
year maximum on voting trusts.
30 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2230 (West 1955) (emphasis added).
31 TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 706(b) (emphasis added). Section
706(b) also provides that no voting trust will be effective for a term of more than
ten years; within two years prior to its expiration, however, the trust may be
extended for up to ten years at a time.
32 Section 706(a) of the New Code makes pooling agreements among share-
holders of close corporations expressly valid and specifically enforcable. See note
9 supra.
33 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(e) (1974) (section 218(d) prior to July 15,
1969). This Delaware provision is described as the source of section 706(d) of
the new law. SECOND EXPOSURE DRAFr § 706(d).
34 E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 27 (1968);
PAINTER, supra note 1, at 104, 446; 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, at § 5.33; Comment,
Shareholder Pooling Agreements-Validity, Legality and Enforcement, 24 ARK. L.
REV. 501, 512 (1971). Professor Folk was one of the draftsmen of DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 218(e). PAINTER, supra note 1, at 446.
35 One commentator has suggested that section 706(c) alone "may serve
as an explicit rejection in California of any rule that a voting agreement can fall
within the ambit of a voting trust statute and be invalid because it does not com-
ply with the statute's provisions . . . [as was held in] Abercrombie v. Davies.
." Close Corporation, supra note 8, at 464 n.197.
A pooling agreement which was too similar to a voting trust might, however,
run afoul of either federal securities law, which includes voting trust certificates
in the definition of "security," or California securities law, which considers certifi-
cates or interests in voting trusts as securities. See note 5 supra.
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Although the Abercrombie problem has been eliminated, the
common law of agency is another obstacle to the use of proxies to
enforce pooling agreements. The holder of a proxy is an agent,
and the grantor of the proxy is a principal. 30  Because of the
consensual and personal nature of the principal-agent relationship,
courts of equity will not grant specific performance of agency
contracts.3 7 The courts are especially unwilling to specifically en-
force stock proxies because of a general public policy against
disenfranchisement of shareholders a8  This reluctance is all the
more remarkable since in general the remedy of damages is inade-
quate."9
For general precautions to observe in drafting pooling agreements see 1
O'NEAL, supra note 1, at § 5.27; Schwarzer, Practical Problems of Organizing
Closely Held Corporations, in ADVISING CALIFORNIA BUSINEss ENTERPRISES 403,
411-12 (State Bar of Cal., Comm. on Continuing Education of the Bar, 1958);
E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 3011.1 (1966); Sturdy, supra note 3, at
291-92; 46 MICH. L. REv. 70, 75-76 (1947).
For sample pooling agreement forms, see E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL
FORMS §§ 3013.1 clauses 2 & 3, 3013.2 clause 1, 3013.5 (1966); 2A M. WOLF,
FLETCHER CORPORATION FORMS ANNOTATED §§ 2036 clause 1, 2037, 2054, 2054.1
(1973, Supp. 1975); M. FOGELMAN, WEST'S McKINNEY'S FORMS, BUSINESS COR-
PORATION LAW §§ 7.07 clause 1, 7.08 clause 1, 7.09 clause 8(a), 7.10 (contain-
ing an irrevocable proxy) (1965); 2 O'NEAL, supra note 1, at §§ 10.32, 10.33
clause 7, 10.35. Oddly, most of these forms do not suggest the use of express con-
tingent irrevocable cross proxies stated to be coupled with an interest. Nor do
they include an express provision that the contract is specifically enforceable.
Either provision would be valuable.
36 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.36, at 124; PAINTER, supra note 1, at 121;
Annot., 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945).
37 1 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 563, 565-67
(1914) [hereinafter cited as F. MECHEM]; W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY § 46 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SEAVEY]; Chayes, Madame Wagner and
the Close Corporation, 73 H.uv. L. REv. 1532, 1535 (1960).
In the words of one authority:
It is elementary that one man can not bind another by act or contract
without that other's assent; and such assent, in order to be effective,
must exist at the moment the act is performed or the contract is entered
into. Hence, though authority has been given an agent to perform an
act or make a contract in behalf of a principal, the act or contract will
not bind the principal if the authority has been withdrawn before its
execution; for in such a case, assent to be bound would not exist at the
moment the act was done or the contract was entered into. At any time
before its execution, a principal may revoke authority. The law will
not force him against his will into what is essentially a voluntary trans-
action merely because at a prior time he had indicated a willingness to
enter into the same by appointing an agent to represent him.
S. STEELE, A STUDENT'S TEXT ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 94-95
(1909).
38 Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Sep-
arate Treatment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 244 n.89 (1961); Comment, Irrevocable
Proxies, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 733 (1965). See 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, §§ 5.04, at
11-12, 5.36, at 123; 47 MICH. L. REv. 547, 548-50 (1949). For criticism of this
public policy doctrine see Rohrlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 7 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 218, 224-28 (1933).
39 Damages for the loss of votes would of necessity be quite speculative.
Cf. Comment, Corporations: Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 36 CALIF.
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Certain exceptional agency relationships cannot be terminated
by the principal once he contracts not to revoke; these are the so-
called "powers coupled with an interest."4 If the agency is creat-
ed for the protection of the agent, it would be unjust to allow the
principal to revoke.41 For example, a pledgee of stock might de-
mand an irrevocable proxy from the owner of stock; or someone
who purchased stock after the record date might demand such a
proxy from the selling record holder. In either situation, the
courts would specifically enforce the contract not to revoke.42 In
fact, some of the cases indicate that the courts will find an implied
contract not to revoke where a proxy is coupled with an interest,
even when the proxy is not expressly stated to be irrevocable."
Certain commentators have cogently argued that "powers
coupled with an interest" are not agency powers at all." An
agency relationship is created mainly to benefit the principal, and
the agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal.4" "Powers cou-
pled with an interest," however, are not created for the benefit of
the principal but for the benefit of the power-holder.46 Therefore,
these powers are not agencies at all, but pseudo-agencies not
subject to the laws of agency.4"
L. REV. 281, 283 (1948); Note, Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 41 TEMP.
L.Q. 480, 480-81 (1968); 96 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 122 n.7 (1947). ,
40 Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823);
Jay v. Dollarhide, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 1023, 84 Cal. Rptr. 538, 551-52 (5th
Dist. 1970); Todd v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 181 Cal. 406, 417, 184
P. 684, 688-89 (1919); W. SELL, AGENCY § 229 (1975); Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d
1246 (1953); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 380 (1929). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2356 (West
Supp. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 138-39 (1957).
41 1 F. MECHEM, supra note 37, at §§ 569-70; F. MECHEM, OUTLINE OP THE
LAw OF AGENCY §§ 265-66 (4th ed., P. Mechem editor 1952) [hereinafter cited
as P. MECHEM]; SEAVEY, supra note 37, at § 1 IC.
42 Pledgee: Deibler v. The Chas. H. Elliot Co., 368 Pa. 267, 81 A.2d
557 (1951); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 307, 309 (1945); Comment, Irrevocable Proxies,
43 TEXAS L. REV. 733, 744 (1965); Comment, Irrevocable Proxies, 28 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 155, 157 (1953). See PAINTER, supra note 1, at 120-21; Annot., 68
A.L.R.3d 680, 687-88 (1976). Purchaser: E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 347 (1957). See PAINTER, supra note 1, at
121. See generally Annot., 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945); Comment, Irrevocable
Proxies, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 733, 736-47 (1965).
43 1 O'NEAL, supra note 1, at § 5.36. Cf. F. MECHEM, supra note 37, at §
584. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 139 (1957) states: "Unless
otherwise agreed, a power given as security is not terminated by .. . revocation
by the creator of the power . . ." (emphasis added). But cf. M. FERSON, PRIN-
CIPLES OF AGENCY §§ 201, 206 (1954).
44 W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS A-104 (1969); F.
MECHEM, supra note 37, at § 655; P. MECHEM, supra note 41, at § 266; SEAVEY,
supra note 37, at §§ 11, 42G; Seavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers
of Attorney, 31 YALE L.J. 283 (1922).
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 13, 376-94 (1957).
46 See authorities cited in note 44 supra.
47 Id.
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Furthermore, many of the authorities on agency law have
found the term "power coupled with an interest" too restrictive
because it suggests that the courts must find a property "interest" in
the subject matter of the "agency" itself.4  Rather than force the
courts to strain to find an "interest," the Restatement (Second) of
Agency uses the term "power given as security":
A power given as security is a power to affect the legal
relations of another, created in the form of an agency author-
ity, but held for the benefit of the power holder or a third
person and given to secure the performance of a duty or to
protect a title, either legal or equitable, such power being
given when the duty or title is created or given for considera-
tion.49
This concept is intended to cover all those pseudo-agency powers
which are created for the protection of someone other than the
power-grantor.5 °
II. IRREVOCABLE PROXIES UNDER THE NEW LAW
The new law expressly declares when a proxy can be made
irrevocable:
A proxy which states that it is irrevocable is irrevocable for
the period specified therein ... when it is held by any of the
following or a nominee of any of the following:
(1)-(4) [The statute lists the holders of certain specific kinds
of proxies "coupled with an interest" or "given as security,"
e.g., pledgees, option holders, creditors, purchasers, and em-
ployees.]
(5) A person designated by or under an agreement under
Section 706.
.. .In addition to the foregoing clauses . . . , a proxy may
be made irrevocable ...if it is given to secure the perform-
ance of a duty or to protect a title, either legal or equitable,
until the happening of events which, by its terms, discharge
the obligations secured by it.'1
Subdivision (5) means that irrevocable proxies can be used to
enforce any pooling agreement created under section 706(a),
which applies to close corporation shareholders. Proxies in other
pooling agreements can also be made irrevocable if "given to
48 M. FERsON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY §§ 201, 213 (1954); F. MECHEM,
supra note 37, at §§ 576, 588; P. MECHEM, supra note 41, at §§ 269, 270. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 138-39 (1957); Seavey, Termination by
Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney, 31 YALE L.J. 283 (1922).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138 (1957) (emphasis added).
50 See id. at § 138, comments a-d. Cf. id. at § 139, comments a-d.
51 NE w CODE § 705(e) (emphasis added).
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secure the performance of a duty or to protect a title, either legal or
equitable." This phrase is taken verbatim from the definition of
"power given as security" in the Restatement. 2 It seems clear that
a proxy created to ensure compliance with any pooling agreement
would be an irrevocable "power given as security.""3 The proxy is
created to secure the performance of each party's duty to comply
with the contract. 4
One commentator, however, has questioned the application of
this Restatement language to close corporations. Professor Abram
Chayes has remarked:
To be sure, the Restatement of Agency definition of pow-
ers given for security fits a proxy given in connection with a
pooling agreement neatly enough. The power to vote the
shares is readily seen to be given to secure the performance of
the duty of the obligor to vote in accordance with the pro-
visions of the agreement.55
Chayes then notes, however, that none of the comments and exam-
ples to section 138 of the Restatement involve the kind of close
and continuing relationship found among close corporation share-
holders, and he suggests that courts may still refuse to enforce
irrevocable proxies in pooling agreements that "run afoul of equita-
ble principles against specific enforcement."56  Nevertheless, as
Chayes' article itself acknowledges,57 the California Supreme Court
52 .See text accompanying note 49 supra. NEw CODE § 705(e) uses the
phrase "may be made irrevocable," while RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
139(1) (1957) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed, a power given as security is
not terminated by (a) revocation by the creator of the power . . ." (emphasis
added). Presumably, a proxy would not be irrevocable in California unless spe-
cifically stated to be irrevocable.
53 Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1165 (1966). Cf. 1 O'NEAL, supra
note 1, § 5.36, at 127.
54 As noted earlier, section 705(e) provides that "A proxy which states that
it is irrevocable is irrevocable for the period specified therein . . . when it is
held by . . . (5) A person designated by or under an agreement under Section
706" (emphasis added).
Since clause (5) is not limited to agreements under 706(a), it presumably
also includes agreements "under" subdivisions (b), (c), or (d). Section 706(b)
refers to voting trusts, where the trustee has record title and irrevocable proxies
are not necessary. Subdivision (c) covers agreements made pursuant to section
706(a) and protects them from invalidation on the basis of similarity to a voting
trust. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
Conceivably, it might be argued that clause (5) includes agreements
"under" section 706(d), which provides that section 706 does not invalidate any
voting agreement which is not otherwise illegal. Under this interpretation, section
705(e)(5) would allow a person designated in any legal pooling agreement to
hold an irrevocable proxy.
55 Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1532, 1543 (1960).
50 Id. at 1545.
57 Id. at 1542.
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in Smith enforced irrevocable proxies implied from a pooling
agreement. 8  However, the new law in effect rejects Chayes'
58 As Chayes also concedes, id., in Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599,
123 A.2d 893, 906-07 (Ch. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130
A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957), the Delaware Chancellor expressed "enthusiasm for
the device [of irrevocable proxies in pooling agreements]."
A recent note in the Hastings Law Journal comments that Smith "has not
been followed with enthusiasm, and it is by no means clear that irrevocable
proxies could today be created so easily." Close Corporation, supra note 8, at
466-67. One case and one law review article are cited for this proposition. The
case is Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234
(4th Dist. 1951). The law review article simply states:
Other jurisdictions have cited it [Smith] often and expanded "interest" to
include the power to sell the shares, and a right of first refusal. Cali-
fornia, however, does not seem to have progressed as far. In Thomsen
v. Yankee Mariner Corp. a proxy given with a conditional contract of
sale was considered not coupled with an interest and was revocable.
Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treat-
ment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 245 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
Because of its highly unusual fact situation, Thomsen provides no support for
the statement in the Hastings note and little support for Oppenheim's comment.
The Thomsen case involved a disagreement over whether Yankee Mariner Corpo-
ration should be dissolved. Yankee Mariner's largest shareholder, San Diego
Packing Company, was the leader of the pro-dissolution group, which held a ma-
jority of the stock. See Brief for Respondents at 6-12, Thomsen v. Yankee Mari-
ner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234 (4th Dist. 1951). For unex-
plained reasons, three of the shareholders in this faction signed a conditional con-
tract selling their shares to the San Diego Packing Company, with the understand-
ing that, in addition to the named purchase price, the three were entitled upon
dissolution to their pro rata share of any surplus remaining after the reimburse-
ment of all shareholders for the original issue price. See Opening Brief for Appel-
lants, supra at 4-8.
With the intention of removing the existing board and taking control of the
corporation, all those in support of dissolution signed proxies irrevocably granting
power to vote their shares to Mr. J.A. Donnelly, the attorney for San Diego Pack-
ing Company. Perhaps out of excessive zeal, however, most of the members of
the faction voted their shares in person at the annual meeting, in full cooperation
with Mr. Donnelly, who remained the spokesman for the group and expressly an-
nounced that he had no objection to the members of his faction voting their own
stock. The pro-dissolution group succeeded in gaining control of the corporation.
See Opening Brief for Appellants, supra at 8-14; Brief for Respondents, supra at
13-17.
The anti-dissolution faction (the appellants) attacked the legality of the
shareholder vote by focusing upon the conditional sales contract between San
Diego Packing Company and three other shareholders in the pro-dissolution fac-
tion. According to the anti-dissolution group, the conditional "sale" violated an
articles provision granting the other shareholders a right of first refusal. "There-
fore, in the proportion to which the other shareholders were entitled to purchase
said stock, it should be deemed to be held in trust for the optionees." Opening
Brief for Appellants, supra at 15.
The anti-dissolution group did not claim that Donnelly held a proxy coupled
with an interest. Indeed, the phrase "coupled with an interest" does not appear
in either brief, except incidentally within the respondent's (pro-dissolution fac-
tion's) verbatim quotation of section 2228 of the old law (CAL. CORP. CoDa
§ 2228 (West 1955)). Brief for Respondents, supra at 18.
For several reasons, it is impossible to generalize from Thomsen about the
revocability of proxies coupled with a contract of sale. First, the conditional con-
tract of sale was ineffective because no right of first refusal had been granted to
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views by explicitly making pooling agreements among shareholders
of close corporations specifically enforceable,59 and expressly
permitting such pooling agreements to contain irrevocable prox-
iesY° Furthermore, the new law states that "a proxy may be made
irrevocable . . . if it is given to secure the performance of a duty
... ,,91 In light of this unqualified statutory language and the
Smith precedent, it seems almost certain that California courts lack
the discretion suggested by Chayes and would routinely enforce
irrevocable proxies in all pooling agreements.
Unfortunately, this tidy chain of logic does not fully explain
section 706(a) of the new law. That section seems designed to
facilitate the use of specifically enforceable pooling agreements, but
its benefits are limited to close corporation shareholders.62 If
sections 706(d) and 705(e) have the meaning that I have given
them, section 706(a) is redundant at best. Indeed, as I will sug-
gest, 3 the effect of 706(a) may be to disadvantage shareholders
in close corporations.
The legislative history suggests that this anomaly has its roots
in political accident. In the first and second exposure drafts of the
proposed new law, section 706 (a) was limited to close corporations,
and section 705(e) lacked its present last sentence permitting all
proxies given as security to be made irrevocable. Under this
version, irrevocable proxies could be used only in close corporation
pooling agreements.
Section 705(e)'s present last sentence 4 was added to the
preprint version of the bill because there might be other "proxies
coupled with an interest" which would have been irrevocable under
the common law but were not covered by clauses" (1) through
(5).66 The specific language from the Restatement was suggested
the other shareholders as required in the articles of incorporation. See Thomsen
v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 457, 235 P.2d 234, 236 (4th
Dist. 1951). Second, the conditional contract of sale was peripheral to the goals
of the parties and was evidently abandoned. As the court noted: "Before any
of the necessary steps to consummate the sale were taken the parties proceeded
along other lines." Id. at 456, 235 P.2d at 235. Third, both the proxy-grantor
and the proxy-holder consented to the revocation of the proxies. See Brief for
Respondents, supra at 14-15, 22-23. Indeed, the attorney for the pro-dissolution
faction, Donnelly (the proxy-holder himself) argued to the court that the proxies
were irrelevant.
59 TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 706(a). See note 9 supra.
60 NEW CODE § 705(e)(5); TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS BILL § 706(a).
61 NEW CODE § 705(e).
62 See note 9 supra.
63 See text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
64 For the language of section 705(e) see text accompanying note 51 supra.
65 Clauses (1) through (5) list certain specific types of powers "coupled
with an interest" or "given as security." See text accompanying note 51 supra.
66 Letter from Harold Marsh, Jr., Esq., to William K. S. Wang, Feb. 9,
1976, copy on file with the UCLA Law Review; Telephone interview with R. Roy
1184 [Vol. 23: 1171
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by Professor Richard Jennings as a more modern formulation of
the concept "coupled with an interest. ' 67  The effect of the change
in section 705(e), however, was to permit self-executing irrevoca-
ble proxies in all pooling agreements.
The introduced version of the bill deleted the words "close
corporation" from the first sentence of section 706(a). The effect
of the deletion was to apply section 706(a) to all corporations, and
not just close corporations. 8 The Department of Corporations
vigorously objected, however. As a result of the Department's
position, section 706(a) was restored to its original form and
confined to close corporations. Oddly, the Department made no
objection to the recently added last sentence of section 705(e), and
that provision remained intact.6"
I. AvoDING SECTION 706(a)
Whatever the reason for the new law's awkwardness, practi-
tioners will have to live with it. Mere redundancy is of no great
concern, but the ironic result under the new law is that sharehold-
ers in close corporations may have less, not more, freedom to make
enforceable shareholder agreements. The last sentence of section
706(a) states:
An agreement made pursuant to this subdivision between
shareholders of a close corporation shall terminate when the
corporation ceases to be a close corporation.70
Section 706(d) makes it clear that the language just quoted
does not invalidate any non-706(a) pooling agreements not other-
wise illegal. In other words, no attempt is made by the New Code
to regulate the duration of any pooling agreement not made "pur-
suant" to section 706(a).7 1
Fimkle, Esq., Consultant, Assembly Select Committee on Revision of the Corpora-
tions Code, Jan. 7, 1976.
67 See authorities cited in note 66 supra.
68 Inexplicably, the drafters retained the last sentence of section 706(a),
which provides that a pooling agreement between shareholders of a close corpora-
tion shall terminate when the company ceases to be a close corporation. Refer,
however, to the Subsequent Developments Note which concludes this Article.
69 Telephone interview with R. Roy Finkle, Esq., Consultant, Assembly
Select Committee on Revision of the Corporations Code, Jan. 7, 1976.
70 TECNIrCAL AMENDMENrs BILL § 706(a)(emphasis added). This section
has recently been amended, which may affect some of the comments made herein
Refer to the Subsequent Developments Note which concludes this Article.
71 Conceivably, a court might invalidate a pooling agreement with a per-
petual duration. One commentator has suggested that a pooling agreement "must
be for a purpose not against public policy, [and] be for a term commensurate
with that purpose . . . ." Sturdy, supra note 3, at 289 (emphasis added). Cf.
Laughlin v. Johnson, 230 I11. App. 25 (1923) (perpetual irrevocable proxies are
void as against public policy).
On the other hand, another researcher found only two cases, Morel v. Hoge,
130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908) and Rosenkrantz v. Chattahoochee Brick Co.,
147 Ga. 730, 95 S.E. 225 (1918), which invalidated or refused to enforce a share-
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The meaning of "pursuant" is unclear. Obviously, if the
corporation does not meet the definition of close corporation in
section 158(a), 2 no pooling agreement among its shareholders is
made pursuant to section 706(a). It is not clear, however, whether
the shareholders of a close corporation can avoid the duration
limitation of section 706(a) by such techniques as the following:
(1) Entering into a pooling agreement which expressly states
that it is not made pursuant to section 706(a);
(2) Entering simultaneously into two separate long-term
pooling agreements, identical in all respects except that the first
expressly states that it is made pursuant to section 706(a), while
the second expressly states that it is not. While the first agreement
would terminate if the company ceased to be a close corporation,
the second would perhaps be allowed to continue;
(3) Entering into a two-layer pooling agreement, the first
layer consisting of a section 706(a) agreement and the second
consisting of a non-section 706(a) agreement to take effect if and
when close corporation status terminates.
The first technique poses the question whether close corpora-
tion shareholders can avoid a provision that was intended to give
them more flexibility but in fact does not. One major thrust of the
new law is to accommodate the needs of close corporation
stockholders. Since it would certainly be anomalous to grant
close corporation shareholders less flexibility than non-close cor-
holders' agreement primarily because of excessive duration. Logan, Methods to
Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7 KAN. L. REV. 405, 418-19
(1959). In fact, even these two cases may have placed as much emphasis on the
nature of the contracts involved as their duration.
Rosenkrantz involved an agreement to pool shareholder votes for specified
individuals as corporate officers. The court viewed the case as simply a suit for
specific performance of a long-term employment contract and dismissed the suit
on the ground that a court of equity cannot grant such relief. Because the court
found it unnecessary to consider the validity of the contract, the case is not rele-
vant. Furthermore, because the contract specified how the shareholders should
vote for corporate officers, it was a somewhat unusual pooling agreement.
The case of Morel v. Hoge involved a pooling agreement between two fac-
tions stipulating that one faction would permanently elect three of five directors.
The opinion apparently held all pooling agreements invalid because of a public
policy against separation of voting power from stock ownership. See 6 Z.
CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 114-35 & n.7 (1976); FLETCHER, supra note I,
at 306 & n.32. The court expressly rejected the holding of Smith v. San Francisco
& N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897), which involved a pooling agree-
ment with a term of only five years. 130 Ga. at 631, 61 S.E. at 490.
Thus, the validity of perpetual pooling agreements is far from settled. In
a book emphasizing New York law, Carlos Israels makes the following remark
about shareholders' agreements: "[tihere would appear to be no legal objection
to perpetual duration, and many shareholders' agreements provide that they shall
remain in force so long as any of the original parties remain a shareholder." C.
ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE 94 (1974) (footnote omitted).
72 See note 9 supra.
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poration shareholders in the use of pooling agreements, there is
no public policy reason to prevent close corporation shareholders
from waiving both the "benefits" and the limitations of section
706(a).
The second and third approaches toward avoiding the dura-
tion limitation of section 706(a) are attempts to have one's cake
and eat it too. If successful, the slight advantage of these two
techniques is that until the termination of close corporation
status, express statutory language would make the pooling agree-
ment valid, immune from attack on the basis of similarity to a
voting trust,73 and enforceable by irrevocable proxy or judicial
decree.
It is difficult to anticipate how the courts would deal with
either the second or the third techniques. If the first approach is
legal, the second technique would also appear to be permissible.
On the other hand, the third technique has effects identical to the
second but might well be held illegal as too blatant a circumvention
of section 706(a).7 4 The discussion of these various subterfuges
illustrates the underlying problem. Section 706(a) does not con-
fer any benefits on close corporation shareholders that are not
granted to the shareholders of all corporations under other provi-
sions of the new law. Therefore, section 706(a)'s attempt to
limit its benefits to close corporation shareholders leads to absurd
results.
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE
NEW CALIFORNIA GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
In my opinion, California should adopt provisions similar to
those of New York which expressly validate all shareholder pooling
agreements and permit an irrevocable proxy to be granted to any
person designated in a pooling agreement.75 This recommenda-
tion could be implemented by deleting the words "close corpora-
tion" from the beginning of section 706(a) of the new law and
deleting the last sentence of section 706(a), with the following
beneficial results:
(1) Section 706(a) would validate and make specifically
enforceable all pooling agreements;
73 Section 706(c) of the new law provides that no section 706(a) agree-
ment shall be invalid because it is a voting trust which does not comply with the
statutory formalities of section 706(b). This protection is not very valuable;
section 706(d) effectively gives the same protection to all pooling agreements, in-
cluding those not made pursuant to section 706(a). See text accompanying notes
32-35 supra.
74 Refer, however, to the Subsequent Developments Note which concludes
this Article.
75 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(f)(5) (McKinney 1963); id. § 620(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1975). See C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 4.21 (1974).
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(2) Section 705(e)(5), which refers to section 706, would
permit a person designated in any pooling agreement to hold an
irrevocable proxy;"'
(3) Section 706(c) would protect all pooling agreements
from being invalidated because of non-compliance with the statuto-
ry formalities required for voting trusts under section 706(b). 77
It might also be wise to place a maximum on the term of a
pooling agreement, as is done in Delaware. 8 Such a provision
might also provide that any proxies created pursuant to a pooling
agreement would be subject to the same statutory maximum dura-
tion. The selection of the specific year limitation would be arbi-
trary, but in light of the similarity between voting trusts and
pooling agreements with irrevocable proxies,79 it might be appro-
priate to place the same ten year statutory maximum" on both
types of agreements. 81
CONCLUSION
Section 706(a) of the new law should make specifically
enforceable all pooling agreements, not just those of close corpo-
rations. Such agreements have been recognized as generally valid
in most states 2 and in California since at least 1897.3 There is
no reason why the new law should be more restrictive than the
previous law governing pooling agreements.
A careful examination of sections 705(e) and 706(d) indi-
cates that all pooling agreements can be made self-executing
76 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
77 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
78 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (1974). For advocacy of such a
limitation on the duration of pooling agreements see Comment, Corporations:
Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 36 CALIF. L REV. 281, 288-89 (1948).
79 Bradley, supra note 53, at 1171.
80 Section 706(b) places a ten year maximum on the duration of a voting
trust, with permission to extend. See note 31 supra.
81 Professor Bradley, a vigorous proponent of identical statutory treatment
for pooling agreements and voting trusts, suggests that such arrangements between
shareholders of close corporations be free of any time limitation and that all
other voting trusts and pooling agreements be subject to a ten year limitation. He
also contends that voting trusts or pooling agreements that are participated in by
less than all shareholders of a close corporation should be illegal. Bradley, supra
note 53, at 1170-74.
82 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs 522 (1962); H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EnTERPRIsEs § 267 (1970);
W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 27 (1975). See
Annot., 45 A.LR.2d 799 (1956); FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 2064 (1967); 1
O'NEAL, supra note 1, at § 5.12; RESTATEMENT OF CoNriucTS § 569, illustration 3
(1932).
83 Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
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through the use of irrevocable proxies. Therefore, section 706(a)
is largely superfluous, and the limitation of its coverage to close
corporations is ineffectual, anomalous, and misleading.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS NOTE
After this Article was completed, the Technical Amendments
Bill added the following italicized clause to the last sentence
of section 706(a):
An agreement made pursuant to this subdivision between
shareholders of a close corporation shall terminate when the
corporation ceases to be a close corporation, except that if
the agreement so provides it shall continue to the extent it is
enforceable apart from this subdivision.
The new language is an improvement because it makes it clear that
section 706(a)'s duration limitation can be circumvented. The
change, however, highlights the superfluousness of section 706(a).
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